FARLEY, Judge: On appeal to this Court is a January 11, 2002, decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board) that, inter alia, determined that (1) an August 26, 1960, regional office (RO) decision severing service connection for nephritis was not the product of clear and unmistakable error (CUE), and (2) the August 1960 RO decision was final. Both parties filed briefs, and the appellant filed a reply brief. Thereafter, the appellant filed a motion to expedite the proceedings based on his advanced age and failing health. Pursuant to Rule 47 of the Court's Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Court may order the expediting of a matter with respect to procedural steps in the proceedings before it, such as the time allotted for briefing. In this case, the briefing had been completed when the motion was filed. In any event, the Court denies the motion to expedite as moot.

On appeal, the appellant does not challenge the Board's determination that the August 1960 RO decision was not the product of CUE. Accordingly, the Court deems that issue abandoned. Ford v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 531, 535 ( 1997); Bucklinger v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 435, 436 (1993) (holding a claim abandoned where an appellant did not include the claim in his arguments and requests for relief). This appeal is timely and the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C.  7252(a). Single- judge disposition is appropriate when, as here, the issue is of relative simplicity and the outcome is
not reasonably debatable. See Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 23, 25- 26 (1990). For the reasons that follow, the Court will reverse the Board's decision with respect to the finality of the August 1960 RO decision and will vacate the January 11, 2002, Board decision and remand the matter for further adjudication consistent with this decision.

Masors v. Derwinski

(Submitted February 20, 1991/Decided February 7, 1992)

UNITED STATES COURT OF VETERANS APPEALSNo. 90-540

Whether evidence submitted to reopen previously disallowed claim is "New and Material Evidence " is question of law which Court of Veterans Appeals reviews de novo. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 7104(b), 7261(a)(1).


Gilbert v. Derwinski

Argued July 25, 1990 Decided October 12, 1990)

UNITED STATES COURT OF VETERANS APPEALSNo. 89-53

In practical terms, under "clearly erroneous" rule, Court of Veterans Appeals is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the Board of Veterans' Appeals on issues of material fact; if there is plausible basis in record for factual determinations of Board, even if Court might not have reached same factual determinations, it cannot overturn them.


Holliday v. Principi

UNITED STATES COURT OF VETERANS APPEALSNo. 99-1788

The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims may not determine in the first instance the applicability of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA) to the specific claims of a particular appellant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107.


Dudnick v. Brown

UNITED STATES COURT OF VETERANS APPEALS No. 96-327

Only Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA), not Court of Veterans Appeals, could consider whether amendments to portion of rating schedule pertaining to mental disorders, which went into effect after veteran filed his appeal, were more favorable to veteran; amendments had to be applied to extent they were more favorable. 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.13, 4.16; 38 C.F.R. § 4.125-4.132 (1996).



Grivois v. Brown

Court of Veterans Appeals review jurisdictional issue as to whether veteran's claims are well-grounded de novo.. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a).

Gilbert v. Derwinski

Where findings of material fact by Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA) are properly supported and reasoned, and Board concludes that fair preponderance of evidence weighs against claim of veteran, it would not be error for Board to deny veteran benefit of doubt; such denial would not be subject to reversal under arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law standard because it was premised upon rational basis and supported by appropriate and relevant factors which were properly articulated. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4061(a)(4).


Lovelace v. Derwinski

Conclusions of law by the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA) are entitled to no judicial deference by Court of Veterans Appeals; however, findings of fact made by Board are entitled to judicial deference and are to be set aside only if clearly erroneous. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4061.


Colvin v. Derwinski

Where Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA) declined to accept expert opinions that veteran's multiple sclerosis was service connected, it was necessary for Board to state its reasons for doing so and to point to medical basis other than Board's own unsubstantiated opinion which supported decision.


Robinette v. Brown

Question of whether claim is well grounded is question of law subject to de novo. adjudication by Court of Veterans Appeals. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a).


Russell v. Principi

The Court of Veterans Appeals review of a Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA) decision that has considered possible "clear and unmistakable error" in previous adjudications over which the court does not have jurisdiction, is necessarily limited to determining whether the BVA decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"; the issue must have been adjudicated below. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 7104(d)(1), 7261(a)(3)(A); Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief Regulations, § 3.105(a), 38 U.S.C.A.App.


Lovelace v. Derwinski

Determination by Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA) of veteran's degree of impairment was one of fact entitled to judicial deference; Board's task was to sift through evidence, analyze and weigh it, and apply it to legal principles to effect that severely impaired veterans are entitled to 70% disability while those considerably impaired are entitled to 50%.


Grottveit v. Brown

Court of Veterans Appeals' determination of whether veteran's claim is well- grounded is a matter of law. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a).

Quarles v. Derwinski

Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA) decision as to the effective date when a veteran's symptoms became ascertainable did not provide adequate reasons or bases for the implicit rejection of potential dates posed by the evidence of record, thus requiring remand to the Board; medical evidence created the possibility of several different dates of ascertainability. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(d)(1).

Eddy v. Brown

On appeal of Board of Veterans' Appeals' (BVA) determination that there was no clear and unmistakable error (CUE) in prior final regional office (RO) decision, Court of Veterans Appeals' review is limited to determining whether BVA's conclusion is arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law and whether it is supported by adequate statement of reasons or bases. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 7104(d)(1), 7261(a)(3)(A).


Hatlestad v. Derwinski

In order to enable claimant to understand decision and reasons behind it, as well as to assist in judicial review, Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA) is required by statute to include in its decisions written statement of its findings and conclusions and reasons or bases for such findings and conclusions. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4004(d)(1).


Butts v. Brown

Court of Veterans Appeals may set aside Board of Veterans' Appeals' selection of diagnostic code for rating decision only if selection in particular case is arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; selection involves application of law to facts rather than clear question of law or review of factual determination. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7261(a)(3)(A).

Hensley v. West

Where Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA) erred in its application of regulatory presumption that certain disorders are service-connected when the veteran was exposed to mustard gas in service, Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims should not have reviewed de novo. BVA's determination that veteran's claim for service connection of his heart disease was not well grounded, or engaged in its own fact finding, but was required to remand case to BVA for further development and application of correct law; since ground given by BVA for its decision led it to erroneous conclusion and consequently to insufficient factual development of the record, its decision could not be affirmed. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.316(a).


Scott v. Brown

In determining whether finding of fact by Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA) is clearly erroneous, court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of BVA on issues of material fact; if there is plausible basis in record for BVA's factual determinations, court cannot overturn them. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7261(a)(4).


Hanson v. Brown

Board of Veterans' Appeals' (BVA) determination of proper effective date is a finding of fact, and findings of fact are reviewed by Court of Veterans Appeals under a clearly erroneous standard.